Essays

What the Difference Explains

For Critical and Feminist Readers

Aaron Asher · Published

In this essay
  1. When a condition changes
  2. The changed creation order
  3. Why does the search become naming?
  4. Her formation and his words
  5. Rule is announced. Naming follows.
  6. A future without his rule
  7. Return to the discrepancy
  8. More evidence to investigate

“The fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every animal of the earth” (Genesis 9:2).

God says this to Noah and his sons after the flood. The next verse gives them animals to eat, comparing that permission to the earlier provision of vegetation. Their relationship with the animals is changing.

What relationship had you assumed existed before?

Animals fear humans. Humans fear dangerous animals. We know that world so well that when a biblical scene behaves differently, we may supply a miracle or dismiss an impossibility before asking whether the story ever established the conditions we think it violates.

In the garden, the serpent approaches the woman without fear, and she responds without fear. Whatever we make of the serpent’s speech, neither behaves as though this encounter is dangerous.

Then the animals come to Noah. God says they “will come to you” to be kept alive, and instructs Noah to gather food that will be “for you and for them” (Genesis 6:20–21). The narrative describes animals approaching a human and sharing life aboard the ark with his family. It gives us the arrangements for that life, without a separate miracle removing the fear we might expect to prevent it.

We may have supplied that miracle because we had already supplied the fear.

Genesis 9 lets us recognize another possibility: these scenes depict the world before the announced change. The animals’ approach to Noah and the woman’s encounter with the serpent belong to conditions the narrative has shown us before explaining how they will differ from ours.

That is a method we can take from the text. When a later passage changes a condition, return to the earlier scenes. Did we allow them their own conditions, or make them obey the world we brought into the story?

Whatever sources we propose for the garden and flood narratives, Genesis 9 takes ownership of those earlier encounters. Its declaration gives the reader information with which to understand them. A proposed boundary between sources does not relieve us of the responsibility the developing narrative has placed on us.

Genesis 9 sends us back to the garden and the ark. Now consider whether Genesis 3 does the same for Genesis 1 and 2.

Here a critical reader reaches familiar ground.

Genesis 1 creates animals before humanity and presents male and female together. Genesis 2 forms the human first, then the animals, then the woman. Between the solitary human and the woman comes a search among the animals that does not succeed.

Why would an elaboration of Genesis 1 change the creation order? And why insert an unsuccessful attempt before arriving at the woman?

Marc Zvi Brettler begins his discussion of the two creation accounts with the changed order, arguing that it defeats the familiar explanation that Genesis 2 fills out Genesis 1. He also reads the animal episode as God initially mistaking animals for suitable mates. The sequence becomes evidence both for distinguishing the stories and for understanding the God depicted in the second. Differing Conceptions of the Divine Creator

Let us stay with that sequence. God has said what the human needs: an ezer kenegdo—a helper opposite him. He then forms animals from the ground and brings them before the human to be named. No helper opposite him is found (Genesis 2:18–20).

Why does this search become a naming scene? What does naming demonstrate that the search needs us to see?

Genesis 1 has already given humanity dominion over the animals and authority over the earth. Give the narrative the benefit of remembering its own premise. What does the human do with that authority when the animals come before him?

He names them.

We might have expected dominion to appear through animal labor, force, or obedience. But we have already watched God order creation through speech and name parts of the world. The human now exercises the authority he received through an activity the narrative first showed us God performing.

We have a thesis to follow: naming expresses dominion in this sequence. If that reading holds, the arrival of someone outside his dominion should interrupt the naming pattern. If dominion is subsequently established, we should expect naming to return immediately. Keep both expectations available as the story continues.

He needs a helper opposite him. The creatures he names are under him.

The failure becomes intelligible through information Genesis 1 supplied. The search keeps presenting a relationship that cannot satisfy its stated requirement.

But Genesis 1 gave male and female humanity authority together. And that authority includes the earth: another being formed directly from the ground threatens to repeat the problem of placing what comes from the earth beneath its ruler. How will the woman share humanity’s authority while standing opposite him?

God takes from the human himself and builds the woman. Her formation departs from the origins of the other living creatures: she is taken from the humanity whose authority she will share. The human recognizes her as bone of his bones and flesh of his flesh.

Now watch whose words we are reading.

The narrator introduces the speaker as ha-adam. But inside his speech, the human calls her ishah and describes the one from whom she was taken as ish (Genesis 2:23). This is the first appearance of ish in the narrative, and it enters through his own account of himself in relation to her. The narrator subsequently returns to ha-adam.

The human reaches beyond the narrator’s designation of him to express what her arrival has made possible.

The connection he makes is consequential precisely because it gives their shared flesh a verbal expression: he describes himself through his relationship to her.

A philologist may object that ish and ishah have different etymologies. But identifying their separate origins does not explain what the human does with them here. The received Hebrew preserves their difference—even the doubled consonant in ishah remains visible—while his speech deliberately joins them. At the moment he recognizes someone formed from his own flesh, he describes himself through his relationship to her. Why does the arrival of the woman bring a new word for the human into his own mouth? The linguistic distinction sharpens that literary question; it does not answer it.

The linguistic observation leaves us with a literary question: what is the human doing by constructing this connection?

He has just recognized shared bone and flesh. He now articulates that relationship through words whose resemblance lets him describe her and himself together. An account of the words’ separate origins does not exhaust the work performed by their conjunction here.

The naming pattern has changed exactly where our thesis led us to look. With the animals, the narrator reported the human assigning names. Here, the human’s speech recognizes shared identity and supplies a relational designation for himself. The woman’s arrival has answered the failed search without simply extending it. The helper opposite him requires a different formation and receives a different kind of recognition.

We can now see why the animals occupy that intervening position. Their formation, naming, and failure to supply a helper opposite him demonstrate the difficulty her formation answers.

Keep reading.

After the forbidden eating, God tells the woman that her man will rule over her. Following God’s address to the human, he calls his wife’s name Eve (Genesis 3:16–20).

Rule is announced. Naming follows.

The explicit naming returns when the relationship changes. Humanity’s dominion over the animals was established before the human named them. The woman’s arrival interrupted that sequence; the introduction of rule over her brings it back.

Had we assumed he ruled her all along?

Many readers know a world in which women have been subordinate to men. Bring that condition into Genesis 2, and her formation can seem to explain why she belongs beneath him. Yet Genesis 3 gives us reason to investigate whether her formation was doing the opposite: explaining how she could stand opposite him before that relationship changed.

Now bring the Tree of Life back into that relationship.

Genesis has placed it in the garden. The permission to eat from the trees excludes the Tree of Knowledge, not the Tree of Life (Genesis 2:9, 16–17). Before the forbidden eating, the humans have access to the tree later associated with living forever.

What future has the story made available to them?

Genesis 1 gives male and female humanity authority together. Genesis 2 gives the human someone opposite him, whose formation answers the failure of the creatures beneath his dominion. Neither has yet been barred from the Tree of Life.

On this reading, they could live forever together without her ever being ruled over by him.

Her position opposite him need not be a temporary arrangement awaiting its proper hierarchy. It belongs to a relationship the story has given no reason to end.

When Genesis later announces “he shall rule over you,” what has happened to that future?

If we make his rule part of the original design, we erase more than her earlier standing. We erase the possibility that their life together could have continued indefinitely without it.

We have encountered this reading problem before. We supplied animal fear before its announcement and then needed exceptions to explain the earlier encounters. We can likewise supply male rule before its announcement and lose the work performed by the earlier search and different formation.

The world familiar to the reader can be the story’s destination without being its starting point.

Now return to the discrepancy with which we began.

The order is still different. But the animals’ position has become essential to an explanation. Put the woman before the search, and the narrative loses its demonstration of the problem her formation answers.

The same feature that helped persuade us to distinguish the accounts now gives us work to do across them.

At this point, a critical reader may respond: a compiler could have created that relationship by arranging separate traditions.

Then let us investigate that proposal. What information did the compiler retain? How does the arrangement develop it? Why preserve a changed order that performs this work? A redactor capable of constructing that sequence requires an account of the construction. The label cannot substitute for one.

The historical question remains open, but its evidence has grown. We must account for the difference and for what becomes intelligible through it. An explanation that treats the changed order solely as an inconsistency has left something consequential unexplained.

This website asks critical scholarship to meet the same standard we apply to our commentators and to my own proposals. An interpretation earns further investigation by making more of the text readable. We carry it beyond its starting point, into passages that support it and passages that threaten it. We widen the investigation until it breaks—or survives long enough to teach us more than we expected.

Your attention to the creation order brought a real question to the table. Keeping that question open allowed the sequence to teach us something beyond its difference from the preceding account.

That is what this method offers a critical reader: more evidence to investigate, including evidence that can put pressure on the explanation you arrived with.

If your explanation separates these accounts, it must also explain what becomes intelligible when their premises remain together.